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Abstract 
Within the framework of any bilevel decision problem, a leader’s decision is influenced by 
the reaction of his or her follower. When multiple followers who may have had a share in 
decision variables, objectives and constraints are involved in a bilevel decision problem, the 
leader’s decision will be affected, not only by the reactions of these followers, but also by 
the relationships among these followers. This paper firstly identifies nine different kinds of 
relationships (S1 to S9) amongst followers by establishing a framework for bilevel multi-
follower decision problems. For each of the nine a corresponding bilevel multi-follower 
decision model is then developed. Also, this paper particularly proposes related theories 
focusing on an uncooperative decision problem (i.e., S1 model), as this model is the most 
basic one for bilevel multi-follower decision problems over the nine kinds of relationships. 
Moreover, this paper extends the Kuhn-Tucker approach for driving an optimal solution 
from the uncooperative decision model. Finally, a real-case-study of a road-network 
problem illustrates the application of the uncooperative decision model and the proposed 
extended Kuhn-Tucker approach. 
 
Keywords: Linear bilevel programming, Bilevel multiple-follower programming, Decision-
making optimization, Kuhn-Tucker approach, Road network 
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1. Introduction 
Bilevel decision (also called bilevel programming or bilevel optimization) techniques are 
mainly developed for solving decentralized management problems with decision makers in 
an hierarchical organization. A decision maker at the upper level is known as the leader, 
and at the lower level, the follower [6, 7]. Each decision maker (leader or follower) tries to 
optimize his/her own objective function with or without considering the objective of the 
other level, but the decision of each level affects the objective optimization of the other 
level [4]. Therefore, the leader may be able to influence the behavior of the follower 
without completely controlling the follower’s action. At the same time the leader may be 
simultaneously affected by the follower’s behavior. An hierarchical optimization structure 
appears naturally in many aspects of resource planning, management and policy making, 
including water resource management, financial planning, land-use planning, production 
planning (coordination of multi-divisional firms, network facility location), and 
transportation planning (network design, trip demand estimation). Amouzegar and 
Moshirvaziri [1], Bard [4] and Labbe et al. [8] have already recognized the need to consider 
these planning problems from a bilevel or multi-level modeling point of view.  
 
In general, there are two fundamental issues in both bilevel decision theory and practice. 
One is how to model a real-world bilevel decision problem that may have various situations 
at the two decision levels, and the other is how to find an optimal solution for the decision 
problem. A number of researchers (e.g., [3, 7, 9]) have established original forms of 
optimality conditions for bilevel programming. A number of bilevel decision approaches 
and algorithms [2, 4, 5] have been proposed to find an optimal solution. This includes the 
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most successful Kuhn-Tucker approach [4]. Although much research has been carried out 
in this area, the existing bilevel technology has been mainly focused on a specific situation 
comprising one leader and one follower. However, in the case of a real-world bilevel 
decision problem, the lower level of a bilevel decision may involve multiple decision units. 
The leader’s decision is therefore affected by the objectives and strategies of the multiple 
followers. For each possible decision of the leader, those followers may have their own, 
different, reactions. The relationships between these multiple followers can be various. 
They may or may not share their decision variables. They may have individual objectives 
and constraints, but work with others cooperatively, or may have common objectives or 
common constraints. For example, as a leader, the Government’s objective in land-use 
planning is to maximize profiles by establishing some suitable agricultural development 
policies. Multiple agricultural groups, involving farmers, conservationists, Aboriginal 
groups, and regions will affect the Government’s policy-making in land-use. Each 
agricultural group, for example, a region, as a follower, has its own individual policies to 
optimize its objective towards different government policies in land-use. These followers 
may share the same decision variables, or may have the same objectives or constraints. In 
such a case, the decision of the Government (the leader) is partially dependent on the 
‘environment data’ put forward by all these agricultural groups (the followers). This is a 
typical BLMF decision problem. 
 
Following our previous work [10, 11], this research generalizes a framework for the BLMF 
decision problem, which describes nine different kinds of relationship (situations S1 to S9) 
amongst the followers. Under this framework, for each of the nine a corresponding BLMF 
decision model is developed. As already shown in this framework, the uncooperative (S1) 
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model is the most popular and the most basic situation for BLMF decision problems.  This 
paper thus presents a definition of an optimal solution and related theories for the S1 model. 
It further extends the Kuhn-Tucker approach for solving the S1 model with a real case-study 
of a road network problem. Related approaches for solving other eight situation models 
within this framework will be explored further in a separate research paper.  
 
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, the framework for BLMF decision 
problems is proposed. Related theories focusing on the uncooperative (S1) model of BLMF 
decision problems are given in Section 3. An extended Kuhn-Tuck approach for solving the 
S1 model is presented in Section 4. A real-case example of a road-network problem for the 
extended Kuhn-Tucker approach is illustrated in Section 5. Discussions, further remarks, 
and future research plans are concluded in Section 6. 
2. A Framework for Bilevel Multi-follower Decision Problems    
Different reactions could be generated at the lower level towards each possible action 
conducted at the upper level when multiple followers are involved in a bilevel decision-
making. Moreover, different relationships among these followers could cause multiple 
different processes for deriving an optimal solution for the upper level’s decision-making. 
Therefore, the leader’s decision will be affected, not only by the reactions of these 
followers, but also by the relationships among these followers. Basically, there are three 
different kinds of relationships among the followers determined by the form of a share in 
decision variables, the first relationship factor. The first kind of these relationships is the 
uncooperative situation where there is no sharing of decision variables among the 
followers. In such a situation, there are obviously neither shared objectives nor shared 
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constraints among the followers. The second case is the cooperative situation where the 
followers totally share the decision variables in their objectives and constraints. However, 
there are several different sub-cases within the cooperative situation which are determined 
by the relationships among the objectives (the second relationship factor) and constrains 
(the third relationship factors) of the followers. Each follower may have an individual 
objective whatever sharing their constraints with other followers. For example, one 
agricultural group has its objective to maximize its profile of agriculture, and another 
agricultural group’s objective is to maximize its land sustainability, towards the 
Government’s policy in land-use. The two followers share all other decision variables, but 
have different objectives. Another pair of sub-cases is that the followers have their common 
objectives whatever sharing their constraints. For example, for any governmental 
agricultural policy, the two agriculture groups have their common objective to maximize its 
profile of agriculture. But they may or may not share constraints in financial, environment 
protection, and cultural in the context of attempting to achieve an optimal solution. The last 
case is the partial cooperative situation where the followers partially share decision 
variables in their objectives or constraints or both. Similar to the second case, four sub-
cases are involved within this one as well. 
Based on the three cases and their various sub-cases determined by the three relationship 
factors, decision variables, objectives and constraints, totally nine different kinds of 
situations among the followers are identified, named S1, S2 ,…, S9. A framework is 
established to describe these situations in Table 1. For a bilevel decision problem, if some 
followers share their decision variables or some not, it will be dealt with as a variable 
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sharing situation. Similar, if some followers share their objective (or constraint) functions 
or some not, it will be dealt with as an objective (or constraint) sharing situation.   
Table 1: A framework for the bilevel multi-follower decision problem 
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Each situation shown in the framework will require a specific BLMF decision model for 
describing it, and a specific approach for deriving an optimal solution for the leader’s 
decision. Based on the basic linear bilevel decision problem model [6, 7], the decision 
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S2 Model for BLMF decision problems 
For
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S3 Model for BLMF decision problems 
For
 and  a linear BLMF decision problem in which K  
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S4 Model for BLMF decision problems 
For
 and  a linear BLMF decision problem in which K  
followers are involved and there are shared decision variables and constraint functions but 
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S5 Model for BLMF decision problems 
For  
 and  a linear BLMF decision problem in which K  
followers are involved and there are shared decision variables but separate objective and 
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S6 Model for BLMF decision problems 
For  
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objective functions, constraint functions and partial decision variables among them is 
defined as follows.  
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S7 Model for BLMF decision problems 
For  
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BLMF decision problem in which K  followers are involved and there are shared 
objective functions and partial decision variables but separate constraint functions among 
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S8 Model for BLMF decision problems 
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S9 Model for BLMF decision problems 
For  
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where   
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The nine BLMF decision models define respectively the nine kinds of relationships among 
the followers described in the framework of BLMF decision problem. Obviously, these 
models will require their individual definitions for an optimal solution. Therefore, different 
approaches to derive an optimal solution for these models need to be developed. In 
particular, there are obvious differences between the uncooperative decision model (S1) of 
which there are no shared decision variables and cooperative model (S2-S5) of which there 
are shared decision variables among the followers. In an uncooperative decision situation, 
the followers’ reactions for each possible action of the leader can be determined by 
considering multiple individual optimizations respectively. While in a cooperative situation, 
the followers’ reactions will be determined by dealing with a multi-objective optimization 
problem put forward by all the followers.  
 
However, for any of the nine models, it is assumed that the leader knows completely the 
objective functions and constraints of these followers and the relationships among these 
objective and constraint functions. The control for decision variables is partitioned between 
the leader and the followers. Both the leader and the followers seek to minimize their 
individual payoff objective functions. The leader must anticipate all possible responses of 
followers based on their relationships.  
 
3. An optimal Solution for the Uncooperative Bilevel Multi-follower Decision 
Problem 
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The uncooperative situation (S1) is the most basic form for BLMF decision problems over 
the nine kinds of decision models. This section, therefore, focuses on this model by giving 
the definition for an optimal solution and related theorems for solving the S1 decision model. 
 
Definition 1 A topological space is compact if every open cover of the entire space has a 
finite subcover. For example, [  is compact in ],ba R  (the Heine-Borel theorem) [12]. 
 
Definition 2 









}.,,2,1, KibyCxA iiii K=≤+  
The linear BLFMP problem constraint region refers to all possible combinations of 
choices that the leader and followers may make. 
 









Unlike the rules in an uncooperative game theory of which each player must choose 
a strategy simultaneously, the definition of the BLMF model requires that the leader 
move first by selecting an x  in attempt to minimize his/her objective subjecting to 
constraints of both upper and each lower level. 
 
(c) Feasible set for each follower :)(XSx∈∀  
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  },),,,(:{)( 1 SyyxYyxS Kiii ∈∈= K  i .,,2,1 KK=  
 The feasible region for the follower is affected by the leader’s choice of ,x  and  
  allowable choices of each follower are the elements of   .S
 
(d) Each follower’s rational reaction set for :)(XSx∈  
)]},(ˆ:)ˆ,(min[arg:{)( xSyyxfyYyxP iiiiiiii ∈∈∈=  i ,,,2,1 KK=  
where arg )}.(ˆ),ˆ,(),(:)({)](ˆ:)ˆ,(min[ xSyyxfyxfxSyxSyyxf iiiiiiiiiiii ∈≤∈=∈  
The followers observe the leader’s action and simultaneously react by selecting  
from his/her feasible set to minimize his/her objective function. 
iy
 
(e) Inducible region: 
}.,,2,1),(,),,,(:),,,{( 11 KixPySyyxyyxIR iiKK KKK =∈∈=   
 
 Thus in terms of the above notations, the linear BLMF problem can be written as 
 }.),,,(:),,,(min{ 11 IRyyxyyxF KK ∈KK                   (2) 
 
We present the following theorem to characterize the condition under which there is an 
optimal solution for a linear BLMF problem. 
Theorem 1 If  is nonempty and compact, there exists an optimal solution for a linear 
BLMF problem. 
S
Proof: Since  is nonempty, there exists a point . Then, we have S Syyx K ∈),,,( **1* K
  ,)(* φ≠∈ XSx
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by Definition 2b. Consequently, we have 
  i  , ,,,2,1 KK=)( * φ≠xSi
by Definition 2c. Because is compact and Definition 2d, we have S
)]}(ˆ:)ˆ,(min[arg:{)( *** xSyyxfyYyxP iiiiiiii ∈∈∈=  
          =  ,)}}(ˆ),ˆ,(),(:)({:{ **** φ≠∈≤∈∈∈ xSyyxfyxfxSyyYy iiiiiiiiiii
where i . Hence, there exists  iK,,2,1 K= ),( *0 xPy ii ∈ K,,2,1 K=  such that 
 .),, 00 SyK ∈K,( 1* yx
Therefore, we have 
 ,},,2,1),(,),,,(:),,,{( 11 φ≠=∈∈= KixPySyyxyyxIR iiKK KKK  
by Definition 2e. Because we are minimizing a linear function 
over  which is nonempty and bounded, an optimal 









1 ),,,(min K ,IR
 
4. An Extended Kuhn-Tucker Approach for the Uncooperative Bilevel Multi-
follower Decision Problem 
 
The fundamental idea to deal with the uncooperative BLMF decision problems is that it 
replaces each follower’s problem with its Kuhn-Tucker conditions and appends the 
resultant system to the leader’s problem. The reformulation of the linear BLMF problem is 
a standard mathematical program and relatively easy to solve because all but 
complementary constraints are linear. Omitting or relaxing the constraints leaves a standard 
linear program that can be solved by using a simplex method [4]. In an uncooperative 
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situation, the leader will be required to first select an  in attempting to minimize 
his/her objective subject to constraints of both the upper and each follower at the lower 
level. It then defines each follower’s rational reaction set simultaneously by selecting the 
individual variable  from his/her feasible set to minimize his/her objective 
function for the leader’s choice. The Kuhn-Tucker approach is the most popular one for 
solving one leader one follower bilevel decision problems. Based on the definition of an 
optimal solution [11], an extended Kuhn-Tucker approach for the uncooperative BLMF 





Let us first consider a linear programming (LP) written as: 
         cxxf =)(min
 Subject to bAx ≥        
             ,0≥x
where  is an n-dimensional row vector,  an m-dimensional column vector,  an c b A nm×  
matrix with  and  ,nm ≤ .nRx∈
 
Let  and  be the dual variables associated with constraints Ax  and 






Proposition 1 A necessary and sufficient condition that  solves the above-mentioned 
LP is that there exist (row) vectors ,  such that (  solves: 
)( *x
,, * µλ*λ *µ )**x
 cA −=− µλ         
          0≥− bAx
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 0)( =− bAxλ          
 0=xµ           
 0,0,0 ≥≥≥ µλx .       
Proof: See (Bard 1998, PP. 59-60) 
 
Let   and  ),pi Ru ∈ iqi Rv ∈ imi Rw ∈ ,,1( Ki K= be the dual variables associated with 







ytt ≤ ),,2,1 KK, ibyC iii =≤+  and   
respectively. We have the following theorem. 
0≥iy ),,,1( Ki K=
 
Theorem 2 A necessary and sufficient condition that (  solves the linear 
BLMF problem 1a is that there exist (row) vectors , and 
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                                  (3c) iiii byCxA ≤+
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                  ,,,2,1,0,0,0,0,0 Kiwvuyx iiii K=≥≥≥≥≥          (3f) 
where i  .,2,1 KK=
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Proof:  
1). Let us get an explicit expression of (2). 
Rewrite (2) as follows: 
  ),,,(min 1 KyyxF K
 subject to ( y  .),,, 1 IRyx K ∈K
We have 
  ),,,(min 1 KyyxF K
 subject to y(  Syx K ∈),,, 1 K
        ),(xPy ii =
 where i  by Definition 2e. Then, we have ,,,2,1 KK=
  ),,,(min 1 KyyxF K
 subject to y(  Syx K ∈),,, 1 K
                 )],(ˆ:)ˆ,(min[arg xSyyxfy iiiii ∈∈  
 where i  by Definition 2d. We rewrite it as: ,,,2,1 KK=
  ),,,(min 1 KyyxF K
 subject to y(  Syx K ∈),,, 1 K
                  min  ),( ii yxf
                  subject to  ),(xSy ii ∈
where i  We have .,,2,1 KK=
  ),,,(min 1 KyyxF K
 subject to y(  Syx K ∈),,, 1 K
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                  min  ),( iiYy yxfii∈
                  subject to ,),,,( 1 Syyx K ∈K  
where i  by Definition 2c. Consequently, we can have ,,,2,1 KK=













    KjbyCxA jjjj ,,2,1, K=≤+                (4c) 
    iiiiiYy yexcyxfii
+=∈ ),(min                 (4d) 





           ,,,2,1, KjbyCxA jjjj K=≤+                            (4f) 
where i  by Definition 2a. ,,,2,1 KK=
This simple transformation has shown that to solve the linear BLMF programming (1a) is 
equivalent to solve the problem (4a-f). 
2). Necessity is obvious from (4a-f). 
3). Sufficiency. 
If  (  is an optimal solution of (1a), we need to show that there exist (row) 
vectors  and w  such that  
 solve (3a-f). Going one step further, we only need to prove that there 
exist (row) vectors u  v and  such that 
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                        (5b) 0=
0)( =−− iiiii yCxAbv                   (5c) 
,0=ii yw                                                (5d) 
where u     i,pi R∈ , ,imi Rw ∈iqi Rv ∈ K,,2,1 K=  and they are not negative variables. 




* IRyyx K ∈K
by (2). Thus we have 
  ),( ** xPy ii ∈
where i  by Definition 2e. Consequently,  is an optimal solution 
to the following problem: 
,,,2,1 KK= ),,,( **2*1 Kyyy K
)),(:),(min( *xSyyxf iiii ∈                                            (6) 
where i  by Definition 2d. Rewrite (6) as follows ,,,2,1 KK=
  ,(min iyxf
 subject to Sy ∈  )(xii
         *xx =
        ),,,,2,1(* ijKjyy jj ≠== K
where i  From Definition 2c, we have .,,2,1 KK=
                           (7a) iiiii yexcyxf +=),(min






       KjbyCxA jjjj ,,2,1, K=≤+               (7c) 
                                                     (7d) *xx =
                                                     (7e) 0≥iy
                 (7f) ,,,,2,1,* ijKjyy jj ≠== K
where i  .,,2,1 KK=
To simplify (7a-f), we can have 
iiiii yexcyxf +=),(min                                   (8a) 
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                                                    (9c)       ,0≥iy
where i  .,,2,1 KK=
Now we see that  is an optimal solution of (9a-c) which is a LP problem. By Proposition 
1, there exist vectors  i that satisfy the following system  
*
iy
,, ** ii µλ K,,2,1 K=
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where   i  ,iqpi R
+∈λ , .,,2,1 KK=imi R∈µ
Let u  v  w  and define  ,pi R∈ , imi R∈iqi R∈
( )iii vu ,=λ  
,iiw µ=  
where i  .,,2,1 KK=











       
Theorem 2 indicates that the most direct approach for solving (1a) is to solve the equivalent 
mathematical program given in (3a-f). One of its advantages is that it allows a more robust 
model to be solved without introducing any new computational difficulties. 
 
5. A Real Case Study of a Road-Network Problem 
In general, BLMF decision actions have the following three features: (1) there exists 
decision units within a predominantly hierarchical structure; (2) each unit at the lower level 
executes its policies after, and in view of, decisions made at the upper level; (3) each unit 
independently optimizes its objective but is affected by the actions of other units. When a 
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real-world BLMF decision model, which could be any kind of the specific situations shown 
in the proposed framework, is established, a suitable approach must be selected and used 
for solving the problem. This section shows an uncooperative BLMF decision problem of a 
road network with hypothetical problem parameters. The proposed extended Kuhn-Tucker 
approach is used for solving the problem. 
 
A road network problem involves the improvement of the road network through capacity 
expansion, traffic signals synchronization or vehicle guidance systems. The road 
management committee (the leader) is assumed to control these decision variables. The 
committee’s decision can influence directly or indirectly the travel choices of the road 
network users. There are two kinds of road network users (the followers), one is public 
traffic user group and another is private traffic users. Let x =(x1, x2) denote the decision 
vector of the road management committee, X the set of feasible decision variables, y, z the 
decision vector (one element) of the two followers respectively, and c  the 
travel delay along a link i. The road management committee’s main objective is to minimize, 
over the set X, the system travel cost 
),,,( 21 zyxxi
)z,,,(),,,( 2121 yxxFzyxxcai ii =∑ . Both kinds of 
network users seek to minimize their travel delays min f1 (x1, x2, y) and min f2 (x1, x2, z) 
respectively. The committee also seeks its minimized travel delays. However, the committee 
is interested in minimizing total travel time for all kinds of users, while each user group only 
wants to optimize its own travel time. The committee has known the objectives and 
constraints of the two groups of road network users. The two groups of users have different 
objective functions and different constraints. This is a typical uncooperative BLMF decision 
problem.  
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In order to easily show the application for the proposed extended Kuhn-Tucker approach, a 
road-network decision problem model is established by simplifying it into the following 






  subject to 5 4062 21 ≤+−+ zyxx  
       6  151321 ≤+− yxx
        10721 ≤−+ zxx
     7  204 ≤+ zy
        yxxyxxf
Yy
−+=∈ 21211 2),,(min  
      subject to 5 1571 ≤+ yx  
           3254 2 ≤+−  yx
                     min zxxzxxf
Zz
8015),,( 21212 +−=∈  
      subject to .540 1 ≤+ zx  
where   ,, 121 Rxx ∈ , 11Ry∈ Rz∈ and },0,0{ 21 >>= xxX  },0{ >= yY   
According to the Kuhn-Tucker approach, let us write all the inequalities but x  for the 
model as follows: 
}.0{ >= zZ
0>
0)625(40),,,( 21211, ≥+−+−= zyxxzyxxgu  
0)136(15),,,( 21212, ≥+−−= yxxzyxxgu  
0)7(10),,,( 21213, ≥−+−= zxxzyxxgu  
0)47(20),,,( 214, ≥+−= zyzyxxgu  
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 0)75(15),,,( 1211,1 ≥+−= yxzyxxgv  
 0)254(3),,,( 2212,1 ≥+−−= yxzyxxgv  
  0),,,( 211,1 ≥= yzyxxgw
 0)40(5),,,( 1211,2 ≥+−= zxzyxxgv  
  .0),,,( 211,2 ≥= zzyxxgw
From (3a-f), we have 
)11783min( 21 zyxx +++           (11a) 
  subject to 5 4062 21 ≤+−+ zyxx          (11b) 
       6          (11c) 151321 ≤+− yxx
                  (11d) 10721 ≤−+ zxx
     7           (11e) 204 ≤+ zy
        5           (11f) 1571 ≤+ yx
      −           (11g) 3254 2 ≤+ yx
      40                                     (11h)  51 ≤+ zx
      1257713 111211131211 =−++++ wvvuuu−       (11i) 
      6 8047 2121232221 −=−++− wvuuu        (11j)     
       0111,1122,1111,1134,122,111, =+++++ wgvgvgugugug wvvuuu     (11k) 
       0211,2211,2234,223,211, =++++ wgvgugugug wvuuu        (11l) 
                 (11m) 0,0,0,0 21 >>>> zyxx
       u                  (11n) 0,0,0,0,0,0 111211131211 ≥≥≥≥≥≥ wvvuu
       u        (11o) .0,0,0,0,0 2121232221 ≥≥≥≥≥ wvuu
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From (11i), (11j), (11m), (11n) and (11o), we can have following four possibilities. 
Case 1: )0,0,0,7/8,0,0,0,0,0,13/1,0(),,,,,,,,,,( 2121232221111211131211 =wvuuuwvvuuu  
Case 2: )0,0,0,7/8,0,0,0,0,7/1,0,0(),,,,,,,,,,( 2121232221111211131211 =wvuuuwvvuuu  
Case 3: )0,0,0,7/8,0,0,0,7/1,0,0,0(),,,,,,,,,,( 2121232221111211131211 =wvuuuwvvuuu  
Case 4: )0,0,0,7/8,0,0,25/1,0,0,0,0(),,,,,,,,,,( 2121232221111211131211 =wvuuuwvvuuu  
 
From Case 1, (11k) and (11l) we have 
0)136(15),,,( 21212, =+−−= yxxzyxxgu  
.0)7(10),,,( 21213, =−+−= zxxzyxxgu  
Consequently, (11) can be rewritten as follows: 
)11783min( 21 zyxx +++            
  subject to 5 4062 21 ≤+−+ zyxx        
       6        151321 =+− yxx
                  10721 =−+ zxx
     7            204 ≤+ zy
        5            1571 ≤+ yx
      −         3254 2 ≤+ yx
      40                                      51 ≤+ zx
                0,0,0,0 21 >>>> zyxx
 
Using the simplex method, we found that a solution occurs at the point 
 with   and . )0.27,2.01,11.79,0.12(),,,( 1112
1
1 =zyxx 111.69,1 =F 10.0211 =f 11.6112 =f
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By using the same way as that of Case 1, we found that it is infeasible for Cases 2 and 4, 
respectively; a solution occurs at the point (  
with ,  and  for Case 3. By examining the above 
procedure, we found that an optimal solution occurs at the point 










) * =F0.27,,( *1x
 
The result shows that an optimal solution for the road management committee is to take the 
two decision variables as 0.12 and 11.79 through anticipating all possible responses of 
followers. Each follower is assumed to execute simultaneously his/her individual policies 
after decisions of the leader for the two decision variables. That is, the two followers will 
take values of their travel decision variables 2.01 and 0.27 respectively as their reaction for 
the committee. The two followers can thus reach an objective 10.02 and 11.61 respectively 
and the committee will get an objective of travel cost 111.69.  
 
6. Conclusions and Further Study 
Many organizations such as universities, Governmental departments, are decentralized, and 
their decision units are within an hierarchical structure. The execution of their decisions is 
often sequential and the leader’s decision can be affected by the responses of his or her 
multiple followers. Therefore, BLMF decision-making is a common issue in organizational 
management. This paper has successfully established a framework for the BLMF decision 
problem which identifies nine kinds of relationships among the followers. These bilevel 
decision relationships may occur in different organizations’ decision actions or within 
different decision actions of one organization. For each of the nine relationships, a 
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corresponding BLMF decision model has been proposed.  In particular, this paper has 
proposed related theories focusing on the uncooperative BLMF decision model (S1). An 
extended Kuhn-Tucker approach for solving the specific kind of BLMF decision problems 
is then developed. Finally, a real-case study of a road-network problem illustrates the 
application of the proposed BLMF decision technique. Further study will involve the 
development of approaches for the other eight BLMF models (S2 to S9) as described in the 
proposed framework. A decision support system will then need to be developed to 
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